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Abstract
In two-sided markets where platforms are constrained to set non-
negative prices, we study the e¤ect of tying and pure bundling. Bundling
can be deployed by platforms as a tool to introduce implicit subsidies
on one side of the market in order to solve the usual coordination failure
in a two-sided market framework. A multi-product monopoly platform
uses bundles to raise participation on both sides, which benets con-
sumers. In a duopoly context, bundles have also a strategic e¤ect on
the level of competition. Contrary to the monopoly case, tying may
not be ex-post and/or ex-ante optimal for a contested platform. More-
over, the competing platform benets from it if the equilibrium implicit
subsidy is large enough. The impact on consumers surplus and total
welfare depends on the extent of asymmetry in externalities between
the two sides, with a negative e¤ect if there is little symmetry, and a
positive e¤ect with strong asymmetry.
1 Introduction
One key issue for two-sided platforms is that the need to coordinate con-
sumers on an e¢ cient allocation may require subsidizing the participation of
some consumers. Based on the initial work of Caillaud and Jullien (2003),
Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2005), the literature has em-
phasized the role of the price structure in solving coordination problems.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2005) show that platforms may
set "negative prices" on one side in order to enhance participation. How-
ever, a direct implementation of negative prices is not always a viable option
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to guarantee su¢ cient participation to the platform. Adverse selection and
opportunistic behavior of agents can be two main risks that platforms could
face by o¤ering a direct monetary transfer to agents. As emphasized in
Jullien (2005), when a platform is constrained to set non-negative prices or
simply perceives a monetary transfer as too risky, one alternative is to rely
on bundles designed to target some customers.
In the paper, we develop a model where a platform constrained to set
non-negative prices ties the sales of another good with the access to the
platform as a way to relax the non-negativity constraint. By giving away
the bundle for free or at a discounted price, conditional on participation to
one side, the platform eventually implements implicit negative subscription
prices in a context where monetary subsidy would be ine¢ cient or could
generate opportunistic behaviors.
The concept of two-sided market refers to a specic instance of networks
where the services are used by two distinct groups of customers interacting.
This includes, among other activities, intermediation, credit card, medias,
computer operating systems, video games, shopping malls or yellow pages.1
In these markets, tying is a widespread phenomenon and may take several
forms. One form corresponds to the practice of o¤ering gifts along with the
service, as a magazine o¤ering a DVD with its paper version. Another form,
illustrated by the case of the Windows Media Player, consists in bundling
a monopoly good with a complementary competitive two-sided good.2 Last
but not least, a widespread practice among web portals like Yahoo or Google
consists in o¤ering for free a large bundle of services to one side of the market.
More importantly, addressing the fact that in several cases the bundle is
o¤ered for free to consumers can be di¢ cult and can pose problems when
judging anti-trust cases. This paper o¤ers a framework in which this issue
can be addressed.
In the paper, the rationale for tying di¤ers from entry deterrence pur-
poses emphasized by Whinston (1990), and from price discrimination mo-
tives as developed in Adams and Yellen (1976) or Schmalensee (1984). The
only purpose of tying is an attempt to stimulate demand on one side in
order to increase the membership value and prot on the other side. The
advantage is that the platform may avoid attracting undesirable customers
by tying the platform service with a good of particular interest for the tar-
geted side. Clearly for such a strategy to be e¤ective, there must be some
advantage of in kind payments over money subsidies. Thus, the best can-
didate is a complementary good. A free parking at a shopping mall is only
interesting for customers intending to shop, or Google desktop-bar is only
1See Evans (2003a), Evans (2003b) and Rochet and Tirole (2005), Rochet and Tirole
(2003) for more examples.
2See Choi (2004).
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interesting for web-surfers. However, since the purpose is to give subsidies
to some participants, even an independent good can be used provided that
its demand is related with the demand of two-sided services. For instance,
magazine o¤ering a CD or a DVD can choose to target a particular pop-
ulation. To this extent, the theory developed in the paper illustrates an
instance of second-degree price discrimination implemented through tying
which conrms the more general idea that price discrimination may help a
network to coordinate the customersparticipation and thereby be welfare
improving (See Jullien (2001) ).
The tying strategy is studied in the context of a monopolistic and a
duopolistic two-sided market, similar to Armstrong (2005), where a partic-
ipant on one side derives a positive externality increasing with the level of
participation on the other side. In the duopoly case, platforms are horizon-
tally di¤erentiated on both sides, and agents register to one platform only
(single-homing). We allow one platform to deploy mixed bundling (which
reduces to tying in our model) and pure bundling strategies and analyze
their impact on the allocation, as well as on the consumer surplus, the plat-
formsprots and the total welfare. In our model, the demand for the tied
good is homogeneous among members of one side so that there is no price
discrimination possibility within sides. In order to emphasize the subsidy
aspect, we focus mostly on the case of tying where it is the sole e¤ect at
work. We then extend the analysis to pure bundling.
In a monopolistic context, when the platform has some market power on
the tied good market, it uses a tying strategy and sells the good unbundled
and bundled. The only reason to sell a bundle is to o¤er a participation
subsidy. The subscription is o¤ered for free, thus the bundle is sold at a
discounted price. When the platform has no market power and the good is
sold on a competitive market, it can still sell a pure bundle at price below
cost. We show that all consumers benet from these practices, since the
enhanced participation of one side raises the perceived quality of the service
on the other side.
In a duopolistic context, we account for strategic e¤ects as the use of
bundles a¤ects the competitors behavior. In a one-sided context such as
ours, Whinston (1990) shows that mixed bundling is neutral while pure
bundling reduces the equilibrium prot of all platforms and thus may result
in entry deterrence. Since it implies a lower price of the platform service
on the targeted side, tying is not neutral to prot. Moreover the strategic
e¤ects di¤er substantially because in our model the service is o¤ered for free
on the side subject to tying and prots are obtained by charging the other
side.
A key point is that tying occurs on the side where the platform is sub-
sidizing participation. Intuition may be misleading unless one realizes that
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the subsidized size should be considered only as the "input" sold to the other
side. Increasing the subsidy through tying has two e¤ects. First, for the ty-
ing platform, enhanced participation of one side gives a "quality" advantage
on the other side and allows to raise the price for a given participation.
But a by-product is such that it increases the opportunity cost of selling
on the protable side. The reason is that more sales on the protable side
implies more sales at a loss on the subsidized side. The opportunity cost
of selling on the protable side then accounts for the loss generated on the
subsidized side, and increases with tying. Thus tying on one side also a¤ects
the intensity of competition on the other side.
The impact of tying on the behaviour of the platform on the protable
side has thus to be analyzed as the combined e¤ects of increasing the per-
ceived quality and increasing the (opportunity) cost. There is then a demand
shifting e¤ect associated with higher quality, and a competition softening ef-
fect associated with higher cost. The impact on equilibrium prots is then
ambiguous and due to softened competition, the competitors prot may
increase when one platform uses tying. Similarly the tying platform may
obtain less prots.
The impact on consumers is also ambiguous. Consumers on the sub-
sidized side always benet from a larger subsidy, but consumers on the
protable side may benet or not depending on which of the two e¤ects
dominates. The main conclusions are: i) when the two sides evaluate the
participation of each other in a symmetric way, total consumer surplus and
total welfare decrease with tying; ii) when the subsidy is given to consumers
who do not value the participation of the other side, then consumer surplus
increases on both sides. But in any case some consumers are hurt, who may
be clients of either platforms.
We then compare pure bundling and tying, where we use the usual fea-
ture that pure bundling modies the opportunity cost of selling to the sub-
sidized side.
Despite the importance of tying in two-sided markets, there has been
little contribution to this issue. Rochet and Tirole (2005) analyze the prac-
tice of tying credit and debit card on the merchant side of the payment card
market, and show that this results in a more e¢ cient setting of interchange-
fees. They share with us the conclusion that tying may enhance e¢ ciency
by inducing a better coordination between the various sides. Choi (2004)
analyzes a situation inspired by the Windows Media Players where one or
both sides multi-home and the tied good is essential to participation to the
platform. He shows that even if foreclosure may arise the welfare implica-
tions are ambiguous. In a very preliminary work, Farhi and Hagiu (2004)
analyze the strategic implications of pure bundling focusing on the fact that
it reduces the perceived marginal cost of selling to the targeted side. As in
Choi (2004), their model assumes multi-homing on one side. They nd that
in some cases tying may soften competition and raise prot of both plat-
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forms. We corroborate this nding for mixed and pure bundle with single
homing. Although the key mechanisms are di¤erent, our paper shares the
fact that bundling results in enhanced participation on one side.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a two-sided
monopolistic framework. constraining prices to be non-negative. We dene
su¢ cient conditions to have a zero price in equilibrium and we study the
impact of relaxing the non-negativity constraint by means of tying. Section
3 extends the analysis to a duopolistic framework with tying. Section 4
compares pure bundling and tying. Section 5 allows the bundled good to
have a negative social value and discusses pure bundling in this context.
2 A monopoly platform
2.1 Two-sided market and negative prices
Consider a platform serving two groups of agents, denoted by 1 and 2, each of
total size 1. The platform incurs a cost fi for each agent subscribing to side i.
Every agent of each group cares about the total number of agents in the other
group. Anticipating on the duopolistic model and for conciseness, we assume
a Hotelling model on each side where the rm is located at the extreme of
the interval.3 Thus agents on each side are indexed by a parameter x that
is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. If the platform attracts n i on the other
side, the utility of the agents of side i located at x is ui = vi tix+in i pi;
where vi > fi is the intrinsic valuation of participation, i  0 is the benet
of interacting with every agent belonging to the other group and x is the
heterogeneity parameter. In the monopoly section we focus on cases where
the market is not covered and demand is di¤erentiable. Thus consumers
on side i buy the service of the platform if x < xi, where 0 < xi < 1.
Dening Di (h) = (vi   h) =ti, the numbers of agents n1 and n2 of each
group participating is solution of the following system of equations:
n1 = D1 (p1   1n2) and n2 = D2 (p2   2n1) :
We assume that:
Assumption 1  = 4t1t2   (1 + 2)2 > 0.
For the purpose of the presentation, we also dene   = t1t2 12 which
by Assumption 1 is positive and  = 2 1 which captures the asymmetry
in network externalities. Notice that  = 4   2:
As said above, we assume that ni < 1 in all equilibria. Under these
assumptions, the relationship between the prices (p1; p2) and the allocation
3The conclusions of the monopoly section extend easily to more general demand func-
tions.
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(n1; n2) is one-to-one, and all the prot maximization programs are concave.
More precisely we have:
n1 =
t2 (v1   p1) + 1 (v2   p2)
 
and n2 =
t1 (v2   p2) + 2 (v1   p1)
 
: (1)
Since our objective is to study how the platform can circumvent the
impossibility to set a negative price on one side, price p1 is constrained to
be non-negative, while price p2 is free. One can view the situation on side 1
as one where there is a large population that is indistinguishable from the
targeted population and that may claim the service while not really using
it if the price is negative. This creates a kink in demand at a zero price, as
undesirable customers start to buy. If the kink is steep enough, the platform
will not set a negative price.
The platform problem is then
 = max
p1;p2
(p1   f1)n1 + (p2   f2)n2
s:t: p1  0 and (1) :
When the non-negative price constraint is not binding, standard monopoly
pricing formulas are obtained on each side, where the relevant cost is the
opportunity cost fi    in i of attracting one agent of side i instead of fi:
This opportunity cost reects the fact that one additional customer on side
i allows raising the price by  i for the n i agents of the other side. We
thus have pi   fi +  in i =  Di=D0i on each side.4 In our linear case, the
price on side 1 is:
p1 = f1 +
(v1   f1) (2   2) + t1 (v2   f2)

(2)
and the allocation is:
ni =
2t i (vi   fi) + (1 + 2) (v i   f i)

:
Following from the formula above, consumers of side 1 can be o¤ered
the service at a price below cost. The platform could (if possible) also set a
negative price and thus o¤er a direct subsidy. From now on we assume that
this is the case:
Assumption 2 p1 < 0:
4See Armstrong (2005) or Jullien (2005).
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Under Assumption 2, the non-negativity constraint binds and the price
on side 1 is p1 = 0. This only occurs when the side 1 is the low externality
side. Indeed one may verify that Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that  =
2 1 > 0. Notice that our assumptions also imply that p2 > 0: The reason
is that prots are positive since the platform could sell positive quantities at
prices equal to costs. The optimal price p2 satises the following condition
(See Appendix for the full derivation):
p2   f2 + 1 (f1   2n2)D01 =  
n2
D02
;
where D0i =   1ti is the slope of the demand of one side at xed participation
of the other side.
One can recognize a standard monopoly pricing formula for side 2 ad-
justed for the impact on side 1: First notice that the opportunity cost of
one more sale on side 1 is f1   2n2, as above, since the price is exible
on side 2 and can be adjusted to maintain demand. However, given that
p1 is now xed at zero, attracting one more individual on side 2 cannot be
accommodated by changing p1: The e¤ect is now to raise the sales on side
1 by  1D01.
The fact that the price constraint binds (Assumption 2) implies also
that 2n2 > f1, which expresses that there must be a recoupment on side
2 for any member of side 1. Indeed, there is no point of servicing side 1 at
a loss unless the externality created for side 2 is larger than the cost on side 1.
For a given level of n1, equilibrium conditions imply that the price p2 is
smaller than in the unconstrained case. Thus, controlling for n1; the plat-
form sells more on side 2 in the constrained case. The reason is that the fact
that an increase in side 2 sales raises the demand on side 1 tends to limit
the incentive to raise sales on side 2 when the margin is negative on side 1.
Although raising p1 is detrimental as it reduces n1 and forces to reduce p2,
it also reduces the loss on side 1 and thus mitigates this e¤ect. A second
e¤ect is that as n1 decreases the perceived quality and thus the demand on
side 2 decreases.
In our linear set-up, price on side 2 in the constrained case is p02 =
t1(v2+f2)+2v1+1f1
2t1
and the allocation is:
n02 =
t1 (v2   f2) + 2v1   1f1
2 
and n01 =
v1 + 1n
0
2
t1
: (3)
The above formulas conrm that the sales on side 2 have decreased
compared to the unconstrained case: n2 > n02.
In the constrained case, platform A o¤ers the service for free on side
1. However, it would benet from relaxing the zero price constraint and
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therefore setting negative subscription fee. Tying is then a way to achieve
this goal by implicitly allowing platforms to o¤er discounts.
2.2 Tying
Suppose that the platform can sell another good. In what follows, the term
"service" refers to the two-sided platform and the term "good" stands for
the extra good that the platform can bundle to the service. Our objective
is thus to understand what are the implications of strategies involving tying
the good to the service.
For conciseness, we assume that only the consumers of side 1 value the
good, while other consumers have no interest in it. In other words, there
is perfect correlation between the demand for the good and the potential
participation of a member in side 1. All consumers of side 1 have a homo-
geneous willingness to pay  for the good, assumed for the main part of the
paper to be larger than or equal to its cost c.5 In this case the platform
would sell the good unbundled at price , making a positive prot. It can
then decide to forego some prot to enhance participation to the platform
by deploying a bundling strategy. The case  < c corresponds to a situation
where it is ine¢ cient for the platform to sell the good alone and will be
discussed in a separate section on pure bundling.
Because the demand for the good is inelastic, only two types of bundling
strategies are relevant. Indeed if one consumer prefers to buy a bundle
instead of the service alone, then all consumers do since they all attach the
same value  to the good sold by the platform. Thus the service is sold
exclusively bundled when some bundling occurs. We refer to the case where
only the bundle is sold as "pure bundling", and to the case the bundle and
the good alone are sold as "tying". For a one-sided market, Whinston (1990)
shows that both in the monopoly case and in the duopoly case, tying has
no impact on the market equilibrium, while pure bundling reduces market
protability for all platforms (hence a risk of market foreclosure).
Since   c, it is optimal for the monopoly platform to use a mixed
bundling strategy and thus tying. Indeed compared to pure bundling, tying
with pu =  leads to the same sales of services while generating a positive
revenue from customers not joining the platform. For the moment we focus
on tying.
Suppose that the bundle is sold at price ~p. As long as this price is non-
5One alternative interpretation of the model is that the good is sold on a competitive
market at price . Then the maximal price at which consumers are willing to buy from the
platform is . The case  = c corresponds to a situation where the platform has access to
the same technology as competitive suppliers, while  > c corresponds to the case where
the platform has access to a superior technology.
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negative, only side-1 consumers consider buying the good. For the reason
discussed above, we maintain the assumption that ~p must be non-negative.
Let pu   be the price of the good unbundled. The utility of a side 1
consumer buying the bundle is the same as if she was buying the service at
price ~p   pu and the good at the price pu. Since the consumers always buy
the good, the implicit price of the service in the bundle, denoted p1, is equal
to p1 = ~p   pu. The demand for the bundle is then n1 = D1 (p1   1n2)
while the demand for the good alone is 1  n1.
The prot under tying is then (p1   f1)n1+(p2   f2)n2+(pu c) where
the prices are constrained by ~p = p1 + pu  0 and pu  : Since n1 and
n2 depend only on p1 and p2; the optimal price for the good is the monopoly
price pu = ; and thus the implicit price is linked to the price of the bundle
by p1 = ~p  : The maximal prot is then obtained by solving
T = max
p1;p2;pu
(p1   f1)n1 + (p2   f2)n2 + (   c)
s:t: p1    and (1) ; pu = :
Clearly, the platform prefers tying to no bundling. The reason is that
tying allows subsidizing the participation to the platform, while avoiding
selling the good to non-interested consumers. Indeed, when side 1 con-
sumers have homogeneous preferences for the good, the only e¤ect of tying
is relaxing the constraint without bearing any additional costs. Notice that,
albeit its e¤ects on the two-sided service, the same is true for society.
The rst order conditions write as:
p2   f2 + 1 (n1 + ) =   n2
D02
;
(f1   2n2   p1)D01 = n1 + ;
where  is the multiplier of the constraint p1   . The interpretation
is the same as before, one more unit on side 2 raises demand on side 1 by
 1D01 and the marginal opportunity cost on side 1 is now f1   2n2   p1.
If the constraint binds, the equilibrium participation levels are thus:
n1 = n
0
1 +

1 +
1
2 
 
t1
(4a)
n2 = n
0
2 +

2 
 (4b)
with the condition 2n2      f1  v1 + 1n2 + :
Proposition 1 Suppose that the platform deploys tying. The price of the
bundle is ~p = max fp1 + ; 0g. Participation is higher on both sides than
under no bundling, maximal at (n1; n2) for    p1.
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Proof. Using  > 0, which is a direct implication of Assumptions 1 and 2,
n2 increases with . Then n1 increases with  and n2. When the constraint
is not binding, the solution coincides with the unconstrained monopoly so-
lution.
When the platform uses tying, for  small the e¢ cacy of the strategy is
also small and the new price is still at a zero level. The implicit subsidy is
equal to the value of the tied good and p1 =  . However, when the value 
is above the optimal subsidy that an unconstrained platform would set for
side 1, the price of the bundle is positive and reects any increase in .
2.3 Prots and welfare
Tying raises prots by relaxing the non-negativity constraint on the price of
side 1 and the prot gain is increasing with  up to  =  p1, constant for 
above  p1.
We now want to compare the impact on the total social welfare of the deci-
sion of the platform. The consumer surplus writes as
CS =
Z v1
D 11 (n1)
D1(x)dx+
Z v2
D 12 (n2)
D2(y)dy;
where, n1 and n2 are the participation levels induced by the monopoly pric-
ing strategy, and D 11 (n1) = p1   1n2 and D 12 (n2) = p2   2n1 are
the "hedonic" prices on each sides. Given that the good is priced at the
monopoly level, consumers obtain no surplus from the market of the good
and CS is the consumer surplus under all scenarios. From what precedes,
tying a good with positive social value raises participation on both sides.
Proposition 2 Consumer surplus is higher on both sides under tying than
under no bundling.
Proof. From equations 4 participation increases with tying. But consumer
surplus raises when equilibrium participation levels increase.
The total impact on the welfare is thus unambiguously positive. Notice
that due to the homogeneity assumption (inelastic demand for the good),
the reduction in sales on the good market doesnt causes any additional
welfare losses.
3 The duopoly case
To extend the analysis to the duopolistic case, we again base the analysis
on the model developed by Armstrong (2005) and Armstrong and Wright
(2004). Consumers of each side are located on the unit line and x follows
a uniform distribution on each side. There are two platforms, A and B,
located at the two extremes of the unit interval, xA = 0; xB = 1. They
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compete for agents participation and agents can join only one platform -
they single-home. If an agent on side i located at x 2 [0; 1] joins platform
j = A;B he enjoys a utility:
uji = vi   ti jx  xj j+ inj i   pji ;
where pji is the subscription fee, vi is the intrinsic valuation assumed to be
platform independent, and nj i is the mass of consumers on the other side
joining platform j.
We assume that both platforms are active on both sides and that the
market is covered: 0 < nBi = 1  nAi < 1:
The implied demands of platform A on each side are:
nA1 =
1
2
+
1(p
B
2   pA2 ) + t2(pB1   pA1 )
2 
(5a)
nA2 =
1
2
+
2(p
B
1   pA1 ) + t1(pB2   pA2 )
2 
: (5b)
Note that Assumption 1 guarantees regular demands and concavity of
the platformsproblems.
The equilibrium with no constraint on prices is characterized in Arm-
strong (2005). Symmetric equilibrium unconstrained prices are pUC1 =
f1 + t1   2 and pUC2 = f2 + t2   1, and the prot of each platform
is UC = 12 (t1   2 + t2   1). Assumption 1 implies that this is posi-
tive. The consumer surplus with no bundle can be computed to be SUC =
2v   f1   f2 + 32(1 + 2)  54(t1 + t2).
As in the monopolistic case, we want to study how platforms can cir-
cumvent equilibrium negative prices by means of tying or pure bundling.
We then constraint the prices on side 1 to be non-negative and replace As-
sumption 2 by the similar condition for a duopoly.
Assumption 2bis pUC1 = f1 + t1   2 < 0.
Note that this implies that pUC2 > f2+f1 since prots are positive. Under
Assumption 2bis, platforms set a zero price on side 1 and adjust the prices
consequently on side 2. We show in appendix that constrained symmetric
equilibrium prices are:
pC1 = 0 and p
C
2 = p
UC
2 +
1
t1
pUC1
When the externality 2 is large, agents of side 2 attach a high value to
the participation of agents of side 1 and therefore platforms subsidize side
1 participation. Unconstrained platforms would set in equilibrium negative
prices on side 1. In this case, the e¤ect on the platforms prot would
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be a loss on side 1 equal to t1 22 < 0 and a gain on side 2 equal to
t2 1
2 .
When the platform is constrained to non-negative pricing, the non-negativity
constraint implies a smaller loss equal to f12 on side 1 and a smaller gain on
side 2.
In the symmetric constrained equilibrium, the two platforms share the
market equally and make the following equal prot:
C = UC +
1   t1
2t1
pUC1 :
which can be veried to be non-negative. The total consumer surplus is
SC = SUC   1   t1
t1
pUC1
The non-negativity price constraint can be benecial or harmful for con-
sumers depending on the sign of 1   t1. The total welfare is unchanged
compared to the case where the non-negativity constraint doesnt bind: mar-
ket shares remain unchanged and platforms readjust prices without welfare
losses. Thus the impact on prots and the impact on consumers have oppo-
site signs. One can see that the platformsequilibrium prot is lower than
the unconstrained one if 1 > t1, higher if t1 > 1. The reverse holds for
consumers surplus.
Typically the constraint raises the prices on one side and reduces them
on the other side. Prot decreases if the demand on side 1 is relatively more
sensitive to side 2 participation than to an increase in the price of side 1
(1=t1 large).
3.1 Tying
Suppose now that platform A sells a good of value  for side 1 consumers
and ties this good to the side 1 service. The stand-alone price of the good is
 and as in the monopoly case all side 1 consumers buy the good unbundled
if they do not join the platform.
The price of the bundle is ep; and pA1 = ep   is the implicit subscription
price in the bundle. Again tying just relaxes the non-negativity price and
the platforms A problem becomes:
max
pA1 ;p
A
2
(pA1   f1)nA1 + (pA2   f2)nA2 + (   c)
s:t: pA1    and (5) :
Platforms B problem is unchanged.
The situation is similar to the monopoly case in that for low values of 
the platform sells the bundle at ep = 0, while for large values of , the non-
negativity constraint is not binding and the allocation becomes independent
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of . The critical level of  corresponds to the price that platform A would
set at the equilibrium of a game where only platforms B is constrained to
set a non-negative price on side 1. Due to the strategic interaction this price
di¤ers from pUC1 and is computed in appendix to be  A, where
A =  

3 
 + 2 

pUC1 :
We thus obtain:
Proposition 3 Under tying, platform A sets a price for the bundle ~p =
pA1 + , where p
A
1 = max
 ; A	. Platform B sets a zero price on side
1.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the value of the good is low, platform A always gives the bundle
for free. The negative subscription fee is compensated by the value of the
bundled product. If Platform A disposes of a good that has high value (
big enough), the price of the bundle is positive since the value of the bundled
good is bigger than the optimal subsidy.
On side 2, platforms optimally set their prices according to the following
response functions:
pA2 (p
B
2 ) =
1
2
pB2 +
1
2
pC2  
1 + 2
2t1
pA1
pB2 (p
A
2 ) =
1
2
pA2 +
1
2
pC2 +
2
2t1
pA1
where pA1 is the equilibrium implicit registration price to platform A.
The two best response functions show the standard complementarity be-
tween the prices of platform A and B in side 2. However, platforms adjust
the price in side 2 by taking into account the discount on the good o¤ered
by platform A to participants on side 1. There are two e¤ects associated
with the fact that the implicit subscription fee pA1 is now negative.
Demand shifting: demand on side 1 shifts toward platform A. On side
2 platform A becomes more attractive. The best reply of platform B shifts
downward while the best reply of platform 2 shifts upward.
Competition softening: platform A incurs in higher losses per customer
on side 1 and it has less to gain by cutting prices on side 2 and raising
demand. As a consequence, platform A tends to set an higher price which
shifts its best reply further upwards.
While the demand shifting e¤ect is clearly detrimental to platforms B
prot, the competition softening e¤ect on the contrary is benecial. The
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combination of these two e¤ects determines the optimal pricing strategy of
the platforms in side 2. The equilibrium prices on side 2 are:
pA2 = p
C
2  
31 + 
3t1
pA1 (6a)
pB2 = p
C
2 +

3t1
pA1 : (6b)
An increase in absolute term of the subscription fee pA1 results in a higher
price pA2 . Platform A subsides side 1 and recoups on side 2. Depending on
the relative magnitude of externalities, the equilibrium reaction of platform
B in side 2 may be to decrease or increase its price. If  > 0 (see Figure
1 left-hand side graph) the "competition softening" strategic e¤ect is not
strong enough to o¤set the e¤ect of the shift in demand and platform B
reduces its price when platform A bundles. On the contrary (see Figure 1
right-hand side graph), when the externality is higher on side 1,  < 0, the
"competition softening" e¤ect dominates and all prices increase on side 2.
Figure 1: Platformsbest response functions.
However, platform B always sets a lower price than platform A on market
2. The equilibrium platform market shares are then asymmetric given by:
nA1 =
1
2
 

3  + 1
6 t1

pA1
nA2 =
1
2
 
 
6 

pA1
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The striking feature is that despite the subsidy of platform A on side
1, its market share may not increase on side 2. Indeed its market share on
side 2 decreases with tying under circumstances leading the competitor to
increase its price, i.e. when the "competition softening" e¤ect dominates
( < 0). The reason is that platform A opts for a higher mark up but
lower sales on side 2 at given prices of the competitor. This rather counter-
intuitive results is explained by the fact that the margin is negative on side
1.
An even more counter-intuitive result is that platform A may sell less on
side 1: This occurs when 1 is within the top range of admissible values so
that 3  + 1 < 0.
3.2 Prots and welfare with tying
As pointed above, due to the strategic interaction and competition softening
e¤ects the impact of tying on the platformsprot is not obvious. Using the
expression pA1 = max
 ; A	, total prots are the following:
AT = 
 
pA1 ; 0

+ (   c)
BT = 
 
0; pA1

where  (x; y) is the prot of platform i in a game where the price of side 1
are xed to pi1 = x and p
j
1 = y, and the two platforms compete in price on
side 2. One can show that this prot is
 (x; y) = C   9   
2
18t1 
x2 +
2
18t1 
y2
+
 + 3pUC1
6t1
x+
2   3f1
6t1
y +
9   22
18t1 
xy:
The e¤ect on the prot depends on the relative levels of externalities on
each side of the market , and in particular on the equilibrium reaction of
the competitor.
Proposition 4 Platforms A prot is higher under tying than under no
bundling if and only if the two-sided network externalities asymmetry  is
such that   (3+6 )
A (+5 )minf;Ag
3  .
Proof. The function AT   (C + (   c)) has the same sign as
    3pUC1   3 (t1 + f1) +
 + 5 
3 
max
 ; A	 > 0
which gives the condition.
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The condition always holds if  < 2+ 3  
A. Platform A obtains more
prots with tying when there are large incentives to subsidize (A large) or
when the externality on side 1 is not too small compared to side 2. Notice
that  is a measure of the intensity of the price reduction by platform B on
side 2. Thus platforms A benets from tying if platform B does not reduce
its price too much, and in particular when it raises its price.
Notice that even if platform A earns a lower prot with tying, tying may
occur in equilibrium. Indeed, tying strategies are always optimal ex-post,
once the competing platform has set its prices. The platform A may wish
to commit ex-ante not to use such a strategy but may lack the credibility
to do so.
Therefore there are instances in which platform A may deploy a tying
strategy detrimental to its prots.
Proposition 5 Platforms B prot is higher under tying than under no
bundling if and only if   32f1 + 
2
6  min

; A
	
.
Proof. BT > 
C if
 2 + 3f1   
2
3 
max

; A
	
> 0
which gives the conditions.
Notice that the condition is met for all  if  is small enough. When side
1 benets more from externalities than side 2, or slightly less, both platforms
benet from tying. On the contrary, if the externalities are much higher on
side 2 both platforms earn lower prots when platforms A undertake a tying
strategy. In the middle range, there may be conicting e¤ect as platform A
gains for low value of the bundle while platform B gains for high values.
A striking feature is that for  > 0 and an implicit subsidy min

; A
	
large enough, platforms B prot is higher and platforms A prot is lower
when A uses tying. Thus when the market is conducive to high subsidies and
platform A can bundle access with a high value good, it would be optimal
for platform A to commit not to tie.
A second important consequence is that tying by its competitor cannot
hurt a platform unless the subsidy is small and is o¤ered to the low exter-
nality side of the market. In particular, if   32f1, then platforms B prot
is larger when platform A uses a tying strategy.
In the following, the impact of tying on the aggregate consumer surplus
is analyzed. Because consumers are a¤ected depending on their di¤erent
locations, distributional e¤ects between sides and locations are also tackled.
Focusing on the total consumers surplus we nd that the e¤ect is positive
when the externality perceived by consumers in side 1 is small.
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Proposition 6 The consumer surplus is always higher on side 1 with tying
than with no bundle. It is also higher on side 2 if and only if 2min

; A
	 
181 2
t1t2
.
Proof. The consumer surplus on side i writes as:
Si = v + in
B
 i   tinBi   pBi + ti
 
nAi
2
+
 
nBi
2
2
The total change in consumer surplus on side 1 is:
ST1   SC1 =
  pA1 
 
1
2
+
1
t1

3  + 1
6 
2   pA1 
!
On side 2 we obtain the change in surplus:
ST2   SC2 =
  pA1   12t1 + t2
 
6 
2   pA1  :
On side 1, tying is equivalent to a reduction of prices which benets con-
sumers. On side 2, the e¤ect is more ambiguous. The demand shift on side
1 raises the perceived quality of platform A but reduces it on platform B.
The overall impact is thus ambiguous. Moreover the competition softening
e¤ect implies higher prices. In the limit case where 1 = 0, the consumer
surplus is higher on both sides. Indeed the utility obtained by the marginal
consumer on side 2 (indi¤erent between A and B) is independent of the
subsidy: the reduction in platforms B price is just enough to maintain at a
constant level the utility of the marginal consumer (who shifts to the right)
implying that the surplus increases on this side.
Consumers are also a¤ected in a di¤erent way depending on their loca-
tions. One way to look at this issue is to measure the change in gross utility
o¤ered by each platform on each side: uli = in
l
 i   pli  
 
1
1
2   pCi

.
Proposition 7 When 1 is small, platform A proposes a higher utility than
platform B to both sides. The reverse is true if 1 is large enough (and in
particular when  < 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, provided that the externality on side 1 is not too large, the clients
of platform B loose with the introduction of the bundle, while those of
platform A benet from it.
For large values of 1, we see again that some counter-intuitive e¤ects
may arise. Figure 2 plots these changes in utility. The example sets t1 = 1,
t2 = 10, 12 = 9 and pA1 =  1. Dashed lines depicts utilities of side 1
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Figure 2: Consumersutilities.
while the solid lines the ones of side 2. The thick lines represent the utilities
enjoyed by consumers of platform A.
The points where curves of the same side cross correspond to equal mar-
ket shares on that side. For low 2 and thus high 1; platform B sells more
on both sides and customers of platform A receive a lower utility when this
platform uses bundles.
Note that there is no instance where all customers benet from bundling
nor instances where they all su¤er as a result of bundling. Thus there will
always be some conicts between consumers on the issue of bundling.
Concerning total consumer welfare the e¤ect of tying depends on the
degree of asymmetry. The total consumer surplus changes by
ST T   STC =

  p
A
1
2t1
 
(3  + 1)
2 + t1t1
2
18 2
  pA1 + t1   1
!
If 1  t1 total consumer surplus is higher with tying than with no bundle.
Otherwise it is higher if  is large or the subsidy is large.
Total welfare changes according to the following expression:
W T  WC = (pA1 )2
Z
36 2t1
where Z =  9 2+ (61+5) +12(21+ ). As we can see, the e¤ect
is ambiguous. There can be instances where total welfare increases or de-
creases. In particular, the zones where total welfare increases are associated
with high asymmetry in the membership externality.
3.2.1 Symmetric two-sided network externalities (1 = 2)
Assume that the externality is the same on both sides  = 0 and set 1 =
2 = . Note that the assumption of unconstrained negative equilibrium
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prices on side 1 and regularity conditions imply that t1 <  < t2. In words,
the market conguration is such that side 1 is more competitive than side
2 and the network e¤ect cannot be too small nor too big with respect the
degree of competition.
Platforms A optimal implicit price is now pA1 = max
 ; 12pUC1 	. Sym-
metry implies that platform A expands its market share in side 1: nA1 =
1
2  
pA1
2t1
: In side 2, platform A, consistently with the general framework, charges
higher prices pA2 = p
C
2   t1 pA1 . However, due to the symmetry, market shares
are left unchanged, nA2 = n
B
2 =
1
2 and platform B maintains also its price
unchanged: pB2 = p
C
2 . In side 2, symmetry leaves platform B neutral with
respect the tying strategy which means that from the point of view of plat-
form B the e¤ects of demand shifting and competition softening cancel out.
Platform A nds always protable to tie due to higher margins in side 2
which completely o¤sets the loss in side 1. Also platform B always benets.
The reduction of losses in side 1 due to the reduction of side 1 market share
and neutrality in side 2 allows platform B to enhance its prot with respect
the constrained case.
However, the e¤ect on total consumer surplus and total welfare are neg-
ative.
Corollary 1 Assume  = 0. If platform A uses tying, then prot increases
for both platforms, total consumer surplus decreases and total welfare de-
creases.
Proof. W T WC has the same sign as  9 2 < 0. Therefore, total consumer
surplus decreases.
Thus tying hurts consumers on side 2 in a signicant manner, su¢ cient
to o¤set the other e¤ects. To understand the result on welfare, notice that
when  = 0, the e¤ect of bundling is only to shift demand toward platform
A on side 1, while the two platforms continue to share the market equally on
side 2. However to raise the total value of network e¤ect it is necessary to
shift demand on both sides in the same direction. Here the value of network
externalities is unchanged because what is gained on side 2 by the customers
of platform A is lost by the customers of platform B. Thus the only welfare
e¤ect is an increase of the total transport cost.
3.2.2 Network e¤ects only on side 2 (1 = 0)
Suppose that only side 2 cares about the participation of the other side:
1 = 0. The degree of symmetry  is therefore always positive and equal to
2.
The equilibrium prices in side 1 is again pA1 = max
 ; 12pUC1 	. As
in the general case, by subsiding side 1, platform A consequently charges
19
an higher price on side 2 to recoup the losses on side 1. However in this
context, by tying, platform A increases its market shares unambiguously on
both sides and platform B reacts by setting lower prices on side 2. The fact
that consumers on side 1 do not benet from participation eliminates the
competition softening e¤ect in favor of the demand shifting e¤ect. Platform
A expands the markets share on side 1 due to subsidies. It becomes therefore
more attractive on side 2 and it can charge higher prices while expanding
its marker shares also in side 2. Tying can be protable for both platforms
when the network e¤ect 2 is small. In this case, platform A o¤sets its losses
on side 1 by charging higher margins and expanding its market share in side
2. Platform B then reduces its price on side 2 as a reaction to the shift in
demand.
Corollary 2 Assume 1 = 0. If platform A uses tying, then consumer sur-
plus increases on each side. Platforms A prot and total welfare increases
if 2 is large, while platforms B prot increases and total welfare decreases
when 2 is small.
Proof. Platforms A prot is larger with tying i¤
2 > min

3 (f1 + t1) ;
3
2
(f1 + t1 + )

:
PlatformsB prot is larger i¤min

; 12 (f1 + t1   2)
	
> 6 
(2)2
 
2   32f1

,
in particular if 2 < 32f1. From consumer surplus increases. W
T  WC has
the sign of  9  + 52.
Tying is actually benecial for consumers when there is no network ex-
ternality on side 1. Consumers on side 1 benet from the subsidy and
consumers on side 2 on average pays lower prices due to platform B pricing
strategy.
4 Pure bundling vs tying
While tying is ex-post optimal compared to pure bundling, it could be in the
interest of platform A to commit to pure bundling. The motivation for such
commitment may di¤er depending on whether platform A just maximizes
its duopoly prot, or the strategy is used to deter platform B from entering
the market. In the last case, platform A may choose to minimize platforms
B duopoly prot. In this section, we compare the prots under tying and
pure bundling.
Suppose the platform sells only a bundle at price ~p: Buying the bundle
is equivalent to buying the service at price ~p    and the good at price :
Thus we dene as before the implicit price of the service in the bundle as
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pA1 = ~p   : Under pure bundling, behaviour of platform B is the same as
under tying, but the platforms A problem becomes:
max
pA1 ;p
A
2
(pA1   f1 +m)nA1 + (pA2   f2)nA2
s:t: pA1    and (5)
where m =    c is the implicit margin on each unit of good sold.
With pure bundling any additional clients on side 1 generates an ad-
ditional revenue m. As pointed by Whinston (1990), the implications for
pricing strategies are equivalent to a reduction in the marginal production
cost f1 of platform A on side 1 by an amount m in the tying model. Thus
the platform prices are the prices that would set a platform using a mixed
bundle with a marginal cost f1  m.
We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium in appendix. Be-
cause of the complexity of the e¤ects, we shall present them sequentially.
Notice that when m = 0, the equilibrium prices and prots are the
same under pure and tying. In what follows, we analyze, starting from
m = 0, the impact of increasing m on the prices and prots under pure
bundling. We denote pji (m) the equilibrium price of platform j on side i
(pA1 (m) = ~p (m)  ). The equilibrium prices under tying are thus pji (0).
4.1 The opportunity cost e¤ect on side 2
Suppose that  < A and thatm is not too far apart from zero. By continuity
of the equilibrium, the platform B sets a zero price on side 1; and the
platform A sells the bundle at a zero price. The implicit price of the platform
1 service on side 1 is thus pA1 (m) = p
A
1 (0) =  :
Considering side 2 the behavior of platform B is unchanged, but the
price of platform A is a¤ected. Indeed the opportunity cost of selling on
side 2 decreases, since the protability of extra sales induced on side 1 is
augmented by m: This leads to a smaller best reply on side 2 of A and
equilibrium prices on this side are:
pA2 (m) = p
A
2 (0) 
21
3t1
m;
pB2 (m) = p
B
2 (0) 
1
3t1
m:
The e¤ect of pure bundling is thus to reduce prices on side 2. Since it
raises the incentives of platform A to sell on side 1; platform A prices in a
more competitive manner on side 2 and platform B follows. Consequently,
platformsmarket shares are:
nA1 (m) = n
A
1 (0) +
21
6 t1
m;
nA2 (m) = n
A
2 (0) +
1
6 
m:
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The pure bundle direct e¤ect increases platforms A market shares on both
sides. The conclusion is thus that pure bundling intensify competition on
side 2.
Proposition 8 Assume that m is positive but close to zero and  < A. If
  0, platform A prefers tying to pure bundling. If 1 is small enough,
then platform B prefers pure bundling to tying.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus when the externality on the side where bundling occurs is small,
platform A would not benet from committing to pure bundling as this
would reduce the duopoly prot and may even increase the incentives of a
competitor to enter compared to tying.
4.2 The opportunity cost e¤ect on side 1
Suppose now that  > A and thatm is not too far apart from zero. Platform
B sets a zero price on side 1, and platform A sells the bundle at a positive
price. A new e¤ect is that changing the opportunity cost of selling to side 1
customers a¤ects the price of the bundle. It is shown in appendix that the
new implicit equilibrium price is:
pA1 (m) = p
A
1 (0)  m where  =
3  + 1
+ 2 
Notice that  > 0 if  > 0 or is not too large. In this case, we nd the
intuitive conclusion that the price of the bundle decreases (pA1 (m)  pA1 (0)).
Accounting for this change in prices, the analysis is the same as before.
From equations 6, prices on side 2 are:
pA2 (m) = p
A
2 (0) 
21
3t1
m+
21 + 2
3t1
m;
pB2 (m) = p
B
2 (0) 
1
3t1
m  
3t1
m:
Consequently, platforms A market shares are:
nA1 (m) = n
A
1 (0) +
21
6 t1
m+

3  + 1
6 t1

m;
nA2 (m) = n
A
2 (0) +
1
6 
m+
 
6 

m:
The additional e¤ect reduces the aggressiveness of platform A on side 2,
while the reaction of platform B depends on  with a price reduction if it
is positive.
We thus obtain:
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Proposition 9 The conclusions of Proposition 8 holds for  > A if 1
 
pA1 (0) ; 0
 
0 (for A) and 2
 
0; pA1 (0)
  0 (for B).
Proof. See Appendix.
It is worth relating these conditions to these obtained in the previous
section when comparing the tying prot to the situation with no bundling.
Notice that  (x; 0) is concave and  (0; y) is convex, which allows to show
that:
Corollary 3 Assume  > 0: If platform A prefers no bundling to tying, it
also prefers tying to pure bundling.
If platform B prefers tying to no bundling, it also prefers pure bundling to
tying.
Proof. By concavity and convexity
AT  C  m = 
 
pA1 (0) ; 0
   (0; 0)  1  pA1 (0) ; 0 pA1 (0)
BT  C = 
 
0; pA1 (0)
   (0; 0)  2  0; pA1 (0) pA1 (0)
The result then follows from pA1 (0) < 0.
Under these conditions, in particular when the subsidy with bundling is
large enough, we see that platform A will have no reason to use pure bundles
to deter entry, nor to enhance its duopoly prots.
4.3 Large impact on opportunity cost
When m is far apart from zero, new phenomena may arise. In particular the
strategic e¤ects may in some cases induce platform B to increase its price.
Indeed we show in appendix, that on side 1, the price of the bundle and/or
the price of platform B can be positive.
To understand this issue let us rst dene a notion of strategic comple-
mentarity on side 1. Dene p^B1
 
pA1 ;m

as the equilibrium price of platform
B on side 1 in a game where the price of platform A is constrained to be
pA1 but the price p
B
1 of platform B is not constrained and can be negative.
Then it is shown in appendix, equation (8), that
@p^B1
 
pA1 ;m

@pA1
=
   
+ 2 
;
@p^B1
 
pA1 ;m

@m
=
1
+ 2 
:
The rst derivative shows that the prices on side 1 are "strategic comple-
ments" only if 3   2 > 0, which holds if network e¤ects are not too high,
23
or if the platforms are di¤erentiated enough.6 Notice that    = 3  2:
Thus the conguration  >   characterizes a situation in which the di¤er-
ence in the network extenalities between the two sides is small.
However if  <  , decreasing the price of platform A on side 1 leads to
an increase of the price of platform B on the same side.
The second derivative shows that the e¤ect on platformsB price depends
on the relative intensity of the network e¤ect on both sides. If side 2 has
the highest externality,  > 0, increasing the marginal cost of platform A
(reducing m) leads platform B to reduce its prices.
Notice that the same condition gives the impact of tying on the price of
platform B on side 2. In particular, the unconstrained price of B on side 1
decreases with m under circumstances that leads B to increase its price on
side 2 when tying is introduced.
One interpretation is to see that the impact of m for a given pA1 is that
platform A reduces its price pA2 . Thus the residual demand faced by platform
B on side 2 decreases. From the monopoly pricing formula (2), notice that
@p1
@v2
= t1 . If  > 0, the platform increases its price on side 1 when its
value on side 2 decreases, which is the case for the residual demand when
pA2 decreases.
In other words, the marginal benet of raising demand on side 1 increases
with the demand of the other side when side 1 is the low externality side ( >
0). Then the unconstrained price on side 1 decreases with the demand on
side 2. Because pure bundling makes A more aggressive on side 2, platform
B is relatively less attractive and its price increases on side 1.
On the opposite if  < 0 a platform facing an increase in the demand of
side 2 would exploit this opportunity by simply raising its price on side 1.
Overall we see that when  > 0, increasing m raises the optimal price
of B on side 1. Then for large values of m two new types of equilibria may
arise.
First, all the prices may be positive and thus coincide with the equilib-
rium allocation of an unconstrained game where the cost of platform A on
side 1 is f1  m.
Second, In the case where  >  , there may then be an intermedi-
ate range of values  such that platform A gives the bundle for free while
platform B chooses a positive price on side 1.
Similarly, when  <  , for low values of ; platform B may choose a
positive price and not platform A.
The comparison between tying and pure bundling prot becomes then
very complex so that we dont pursue it further (the equilibrium allocation
are presented in appendix).
6The explicit condition is 3t1t2 > 21 + 
2
2 + 12:
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4.4 Symmetric network e¤ect (1 = 2)
In this example we study the case of pure bundling under the hypothesis of
symmetric network externalities between the two sides (1 = 2 = ). In
this case, given  = 0, it is immediate to see that p^B1
 
pA1 ;m

increases with
pA1 and is independent of m. Thus platform B never chooses a positive price
on side 1: Platform A then charges
pA1 (m) = max

 ; A   1
2
m

while platform B is still constrained. Under symmetry there are thus only
two relevant pricing regimes to study.
Demands are:
nA1 (m) =
1
2
  p
A
1 (m)
2t1
+
2
6 t1
m
nA2 (m) =
1
2
+

6 
m
Platform A sells more under pure bundling than under tying or no bundling
on both markets.
We then obtain:
Proposition 10 If  = 0, platform A prefers tying to pure bundling, and
at least for  small platform B prefers pure bundling to tying.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, at least for the case of symmetric externalities, pure bundling is
unlikely to emerge, irrespective of whether Platform A accomodate or trie
to foreclosure the market to B.
5 Bundling ine¢ cient goods: pure bundling vs no
bundling
In what precedes we assumed that m =    c > 0 which corresponds to the
case where the rm has some market power that allows it to sell the good
at a price above cost. As already pointed, when such a possibility doesnt
exist, the platform may still subsidize participation by bundling a good such
that m < 0 but  > 0 and setting a price below  for the bundle. Under such
a circumstance, the good will not be sold unbundled as this would involve
a loss.7 In this section we allow for m < 0, and extends the analysis to pure
bundling.8
7 In the case m < 0, the platform may wish to commit to tying (in duopoly) but ex-post
it could always set a price c and not sell. Thus the platform would need to commit to set
a price  for the good alone along with a tying strategy.
8Notice that platform B could follow the same strategy. We ignore this issue here
so that the question is whether there is an equilibrium where some platform commits to
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5.1 Monopoly
As before the bundle is sold at price ~p, and the implicit price of the service
is p1 = ~p  . In the monopoly case, the demand of bundle on side 1 is then
equal to D1 (p1   1n2), leading to a prot for the monopoly platform:
P = max
p1;p2
(p1   f1)n1 + (p2   f2)n2 +m:n1
s:t: p1   
where the demand n1 and n2 are solutions of (1) as before.
As already mentioned the equilibrium prices and the equilibrium alloca-
tion are the same as with tying by a platform with a marginal cost f1 m on
side 1. Equation 3 and 4 show that the participation levels are decreasing
with the marginal cost:
Proposition 11 Consider a monopoly platform selling a pure bundle. Then
the participation levels are nondecreasing with  and m on both sides.
Proof. If the constraint is binding, the allocation is given by (4), evaluated
for a cost f1  m which denes increasing quantities. When the constraint
is not binding:
n1 = n

1 +
2t2

m
n2 = n

2 +
(1 + 2)

m
again increasing with m. Thus participation increases with .
Whenm is negative but close to zero, a pure bundle induces participation
levels close to the mixed bundle, and thus above the unbundled case. But
when m is large negative relative to ; in particular if the value  is small
and the cost c is high, participation with a pure bundle will be smaller than
with no bundle.
A direct computation shows also that the price of the pure bundle is
~p = max

p1 +   
2  + 1

(   c) ; 0

:
When externalities are small, the price of the bundle is monotonic with
. But the case where 2    2 < 0 is more counter-intuitive as the price
of the bundle is non-increasing with . In this case the bundle is sold at a
zero price for values  above some threshold.
In general pure bundling implies a gain (relaxing the no-subsidy con-
straint) and a loss since the good is sold at a price below cost if m < 0 and
some protable sales are foregone if m > 0: It is immediate that the pure
bundling.
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bundling prot is increasing with  (as long as the constraint binds) and
with the margin m:
Given that pure bundling and tying yield the same positive gain in prot
for a zero margin, we obtain:
Proposition 12 For any given ; there exists m < 0 such that P   is
positive for 0  m > m.
Concerning the impact on consumer surplus we should account for the
fact that the objective of the platform bundling is to raise participation
which should benet consumers.
Conjecture 1 If platform A is a monopoly and P  > 0; then consumer
surplus is higher on both sides under pure bundling than under no bundling.
5.2 Duopoly
Considering the duopoly case, the analysis is similar to the one developed in
the preceding section except that now m can be negative. When m is close
to zero, the allocation and the prots with pure bundling will be close to the
allocation with tying. The previous conclusions on the comparison between
tying and no bundling apply to the comparison between pure bundling and
no bundling.
However the comparison between pure and tying is reversed. In partic-
ular for  = 0 and m < 0, platform A prefers pure bundling to tying.
For m large negative, the analysis parallels the analysis of the previous
section (See Appendix), and any prices may become positive on side 1. To
simplify matters we present the case of a symmetric network e¤ects.
So assume  = 0 which implies 1 = 2 = . Under symmetry there
are only three relevant pricing regimes to study. The rst case occurs when
m > pUC1 + 2 and both platforms are constrained to set zero prices. In the
second one, 3pUC1 < m < p
UC
1 +2; platform A charges a positive price p
A
1 =
1
2p
UC
1   12m, while platform B is still constrained. In the third one which
occurs when m < 3pUC1 ; both platforms charge positive prices (respectively,
pA1 = p
UC
1   23m and pB1 = pUC1   13m). Therefore, under symmetry, platform
A never su¤ers from a situation in which she is constrained and the rival is
not. Note also that the case when both platforms can charge positive prices
arises only when m < 0.
The impact on the protsincrement with respect the constrained case
(and therefore on the incentives to pure bundle) is complex. We illustrate
the e¤ects with an example obtained by letting  and  varying with   = 10,
t1 = 1, f1 = 1=2 and c = 1=2. Figure 3 shows the zone of positivity and
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negativity of the prots increments of both platforms compared to no bundle,
by plotting the change in prot for values of :
We see that platform B benets unless m is large positive. Platform A
benets as long as  is not too small, thus for m mildly negative. When m
is very low, platform A would choose not to bundle the good.
The pattern for the prot gains obtained for m < 0 is the same for the
other regimes: platform B always prefers pure bundle to no bundle, platform
A also unless m is very small negative. The di¤erence is that for m large
positive the gain of platform A may be negative.
Figure 3: Platformsprots
Thus low social value of the good determines a situation in which plat-
form B benets from bundling (competition softening e¤ect). However,
when the value of the good becomes large positive the standard foreclos-
ing e¤ect may arise since platform B can be hurt. This conrms the results
that in a two-sided framework there could be foreclosure through bundling.
Figure 4: Consumerssurplus and total welfare
Figure 4 depicts the consumer surplus and total welfare e¤ects under
symmetry.
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The graph shows that the conclusion that when 1 = 2, tying has a
negative impact on consumer surplus and welfare, extends to the case of
pure bundling when m < 0: The same conclusion applies to the other two
regimes.
Notice however that pure bundle can both protable for A and for welfare
if m is positive.
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A The monopoly case
Proof. For the proofs we may rely on the inverse demand, which can be
written as
pi = vi   niti + in i; (7)
where vi niti is the inverse of the demand function Di;and will be referred
to as the "hedonic price". The prot function is
max
n1;n2
(v1   n1t1   f1)n1 + (v2   n2t2   f2)n2 + (1 + 2)n1n2
s:t: p1 = v1   n1t1 + 1n2  0
The optimal quantities obtained at
v1   n1t1   t1n1 + (1 + 2)n2 = f1 + t1
v2   n2t2   t2n2 + (1 + 2)n1 = f2   1
where  is non negative and is the multiplier of the non-negativity constraint.
The solution reduces to
v2   n2t2   t2n2 + 2n1 + (n1 + )1 = f2
 (v1   n1t1 + 1n2) = 0
2n2   f1
t1
= n1 +   n1
which gives the rst order conditions.
When bundling is used we have to consider the program
max
n1;n2
(v1   n1t1   f1 + m)n1 + (v2   n2t2   f2)n2 + (1 + 2)n1n2 + (1  )m
s:t: v1   n1t1 + 1n2 +   0
where  = 1 if there is pure bundling,  = 0 if there is mixed bundling. The
solution is
v1   n1t1   t1n1 + (1 + 2)n2 = f1   m+ t1
v2   n2t2   t2n2 + (1 + 2)n1 = f2   1
 (v1   n1t1 + 1n2 + ) = 0
which yield the new rst order conditions.
B Duopoly
B.1 Duopoly with no bundle
Proof. Denote by A the multiplier associated to the non-negativity con-
straint. Taking derivatives of the Lagrangians we obtain the following rst
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order conditions for platform A:
0 =
1
2
+
1(p
B
2   pA2 ) + t2(pB1   pA1 )
2 
  2
 
pA2   f2

2 
  t2
 
pA1   f1

2 
+ A
0 =
1
2
+
2(p
B
1   pA1 ) + t1(pB2   pA2 )
2 
  t1
 
pA2   f2

2 
  1
 
pA1   f1

2 
and the symmetric for B: If pUC1 is negative, both the problems of the
platforms are constrained. Therefore, setting pA1 = p
B
1 = 0 and 
A = B >
0, we obtain the following optimal response functions, for platform A:
pA2 (p
B
2 ) =
1
2
pB2 +
f2 + t2   1
2
+
1
2t1
(f1 + t1   2)
pB2 (p
A
2 ) =
1
2
pA2 +
f2 + t2   1
2
+
1
2t1
(f1 + t1   2)
The optimal constrained symmetric equilibrium prices are:
pC1 = 0
pC2 = f2 + t2   1 +
1
t1
(f1 + t1   2)
with :
 =  f1 + t1   2
2t1
> 0:
Platforms share the market equally and the equilibrium prots are
C = UC +
1   t1
2t1
(f1 + t1   2)
B.2 Duopoly with mixed bundle
Proof of Proposition 3. When platform A uses mixed bundles, rst
order conditions yield
0 =
1
2
+
1(p
B
2   pA2 ) + t2(pB1   pA1 )
2 
  2
 
pA2   f2

2 
  t2
 
pA1   f1

2 
+ A;
0 =
1
2
  1(p
B
2   pA2 ) + t2(pB1   pA1 )
2 
  2
 
pB2   f2

2 
  t2
 
pB1   f1

2 
+ B;
on side 1, and
0 =
1
2
+
2(p
B
1   pA1 ) + t1(pB2   pA2 )
2 
  t1
 
pA2   f2

2 
  1
 
pA1   f1

2 
;
0 =
1
2
  2(p
B
1   pA1 ) + t1(pB2   pA2 )
2 
  t1
 
pB2   f2

2 
  1
 
pB1   f1

2 
;
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on side 2.
First, for given prices pA1 and p
B
1 on side 1, the optimal response functions
on side 2 are:
pA2 (p
B
2 ) =
1
2
pB2 +
1
2
pC2  
1 + 2
2t1
pA1 +
2
2t1
pB1 ;
pB2 (p
A
2 ) =
1
2
pA2 +
1
2
pC2  
1 + 2
2t1
pB1 +
2
2t1
pA1 :
Solving for these prices we obtain
pA2 = p
C
2  (2 + 21)
pA1
3t1
+(2   1) p
B
1
3t1
and pB2 = p
C
2  (2 + 21)
pB1
3t1
+(2   1) p
A
1
3t1
:
The rst order conditions on market 1 then write:
A =
(+ 2 ) pA1   (   ) pB1
6 t1
  (f1 + t1   2)
2t1
B =
(+ 2 ) pB1   (   ) pA1
6 t1
  (f1 + t1   2)
2t1
First notice that it is not possible that no constraint binds.
Now suppose that both constraints are still binding. Therefore the prices
are pA1 =   and pB1 = 0: Observe that A < B which implies that this is
the solution if A > 0 or pA1 =   >  A = (f1 + t1   2) 3 +2  .
Now suppose  > A. Setting A = 0 and B > 0, the equilibrium prices
are pA1 =  A and pB1 = 0:we verify that:
B =   2 +  
2t1( + 2 )
(f1 + t1   2) > 0:
The prices on side 2 are then
pA2 = p
C
2   (2 + 21)
  A
3t1
pB2 = p
C
2 + (2   1)
  A
3t1
Proof of proposition 7.
1n
A
2   pA1   1
1
2
=

1 (2   1) + 6 
6 
  pA1 
2n
A
1   pA2  

2
1
2
  pC2

=

t1t2 (2   1)  31 
2 

  p
A
1
3t1

1n
B
2   1
1
2
= 1

2   1
6 

pA1
2n
B
1   pB2  

2
1
2
  pC2

=

t1t2 (2   1) + 31 
2 

pA1
3t1
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For 1 close to zero, the rst two are positive and the last two are negative.
But the reverse holds if 1   2 is large positive and   is small.
B.3 Duopoly with pure bundle
Proof. When platform A sells a pure bundle, its problem is thus:
max
pA1 ;p
A
2
(pA1   f1 +m)nA1 + (pA2   f2)nA2
s:t: pA1    and (5)
while platforms B problem is unchanged. When platform A uses mixed
bundles, rst order conditions yield
0 =
1
2
+
1(p
B
2   pA2 ) + t2(pB1   pA1 )
2 
  2
 
pA2   f2

2 
  t2
 
pA1   f1 +m

2 
+ A
0 =
1
2
  1(p
B
2   pA2 ) + t2(pB1   pA1 ))
2 
  2
 
pB2   f2

2 
  t2
 
pB1   f1

2 
+ B
on side 1, and
0 =
1
2
+
2(p
B
1   pA1 ) + t1(pB2   pA2 )
2 
  t1
 
pA2   f2

2 
  1
 
pA1   f1 +m

2 
0 =
1
2
  2(p
B
1   pA1 ) + t1(pB2   pA2 )
2 
  t1
 
pB2   f2

2 
  1
 
pB1   f1

2 
on side 2.
First, for given prices pA1 and p
B
1 on side 1, the optimal response functions
on side 2 are:
pA2 (p
B
2 ) =
1
2
pB2 +
1
2
pC2  
1
2t1
m  1 + 2
2t1
pA1 +
2
2t1
pB1 ;
pB2 (p
A
2 ) =
1
2
pA2 +
1
2
pC2  
1 + 2
2t1
pB1 +
2
2t1
pA1 :
Solving for these prices we obtain
pA2 = p
C
2  
21
3t1
m  (2 + 21) p
A
1
3t1
+ (2   1) p
B
1
3t1
pB2 = p
C
2  
1
3t1
m  (2 + 21) p
B
1
3t1
+ (2   1) p
A
1
3t1
:
The rst order conditions on market 1 then write:
A =
(+ 2 ) pA1   (   ) pB1   3 pUC1 + (3  + 1 (2   1))m
6 t1
B =
(+ 2 ) pB1   (   ) pA1   3 pUC1   1 (2   1)m
6 t1
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Suppose that both non-negativity constraint bind, then pA1 =  ; pB1 = 0
and
A =
  ( + 2 )  3 pUC1 + (3  + 1 (2   1))m
6 t1
B =
 (   )  3 pUC1   1 (2   1)m
6 t1
This is an equilibrium if
 B(m)     A(m); when     > 0
  minf B(m);  A(m)g; when     < 0
   A (m) and 3 pUC1 + 1 (2   1) < 0 when     = 0
where  A(m) = A + m; and  =
3  + 1 (2   1)
 + 2 
 B(m) =
3 pUC1 + 1 (2   1)m
    :
Suppose now that A = 0 and B = 0. Solving the system we obtain the
following equilibrium prices:
pA1 (m) = p
UC
1  

1 (2   1) +  + 2 
2 +  

m
pB1 (m) = p
UC
1   (
3   2 (2   1)
2 +  
)m
which can be solution if
   pA1 (m) and pB1 (m)  0
Suppose now that A = 0 and B > 0, consequently pB1 = 0. Solving the
system we obtain the following equilibrium prices:
pA1 =   A(m)
B =
  (2 +  ) pUC1 + (3   2 (2   1))m
2t1( + 2 )
which is an equilibrium if
 >  A(m) and 0  pB1 (m) :
Suppose now that A > 0 and B = 0, consequently pA1 =  . Solving the
system we obtain the following equilibrium prices:
pB1 =
3 pUC1 + (   ) ( ) + 1 (2   1)m
+ 2 
(8)
A =
  (2 +  )   + pUC1 + (1 (2   1) +  + 2 )m
2t1 ( + 2 )
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which is an equilibrium if:
 < min

 B(m); pA1 (m)
	
; when     > 0
 B(m) <  <  pA1 (m) ; when     < 0
 <  pA1 (m) and 3 pUC1 + 1 (2   1) > 0; when     = 0
Notice that:
 A(m)   B(m) =   3  (  + 2)
( + 2 ) (   )p
B
1 (m)
A(m)   B(m) =  

+ 2 
   

pB1 (m)
Notice also that
B (m) =  pUC1 +(
3   2 (2   1)
2 +  
)m =  pUC1 +(
     1 (2   1)
2 +  
)m::
Summing up, we have the following cases.
 First if pB1 (m) > 0 and pA1 (m) +  > 0; no price is constrained by
the non-negativity constraint.
Otherwise:
 When     > 0:
When pB1 (m) < 0; the price of the bundle is zero for  
 A(m);and pB1 > 0 if  <  
B(m):
When pB1 (m) > 0; the price of the bundle is zero and pB1 > 0:
 When     < 0:
When pB1 (m) < 0; the price of the bundle is zero for    A(m);
and pB1 = 0:
When pB1 (m) > 0, the price of the bundle is zero, and pB1 > 0 if
 >  B(m).
 When      = 0; note that  A(m) =  pA1 (m) > 0. We thus have
two cases:
When pA1 (m) >  , there are two regimes according to whether
pB1 (m) is positive or negative.
 When pA1 (m) <  , there are two regimes according to whether
3 pUC1 + 1 (2   1) is positive or negative.
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Proof of propositions 9 and 8. Platforms total prots are thus:
AP (m) = (p
A
1 (m) ; 0) +
1( 6  + 2pA1 (m) + 1m)
18t1 
m
BP (m) = (0; p
A
1 (m)) +
3 (3t1   1)  (8  + 1(   1))pA1 (m) + 21m
18t1 
m
where (x; y) is dened in the section on tying. Recall that AT (m) =
(pA1 (0) ; 0) +m. We thus have:
d
 
AP (m) AT (m)

dm
jm=0= 1( 6   2(2   1))
18t1 
  1
which is negative if 1  2: Recall that BT (m) = (0; pA1 (0)). When
p (m) = p (0), we thus have:
d
 
BP (m) BT

dm
jm=0= 3 (3t1   1) + (7  + t1t2   2
2
1)
18t1 
which is positive if 1 is small.
The equilibrium prots are still given by the above equations. The slopes
d(jP (m) jT (m))
dm jm=0 are now augmented by  1
 
pA1 (0) ; 0

for A and
 2
 
0; pA1 (0)

for B.
Proof of proposition 10. The prot is:
AP (m) = 
C   1
2t1
pA1 (m)
2 +
(t1 + f1   )
2t1
pA1 (m) +
( 6  + m)
18t1 
m
BP (m) = 
C   f1
2t1
pA1 (m) +
3 (3t1   )  (8   2)pA1 (m) + 2m
18t1 
m
For  small, the prot of platform B increases with m and decreases with
pA1 . Thus platform B prefers the situation with pure bundling (m > 0)
to tying (m = 0). Notice that interiority conditions nAi < 1 imply that
m < min

3 
2
 
t1 + p
A
1 (m)

; 3 
	
.
Using pUC1 = t1 + f1    and m < 3  we have:
AP (m) < 
C +
1
2t1
 
pUC1   pA1 (m)

pA1 (m) :
Since pA1 (m) = p
A
1 (0) if p
A
1 (0) =  , we conrm also that platform A
prefers tying when it implies a free bundle. Moreover, in the case where tying
implies a positive price, pA1 (0) =
pUC1
2 ; implying that the RHS is maximal in
pA1 . Thus platform A prefers tying.
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